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Introduction
As the constitutional transition in South Africa moves to a
close, the radical urban civics which arose in the 1980s to
destroy apartheid, find themselves in a central but unenviably
precarious position. The anomalies entailed in ending a racial
dictatorship have stamped a peculiar identity onto these
residents' associations. Unelected by testable procedures, and
with only rudimentary mechanisms of consultation, civics have
entered the transitionary process as 'the sole and legitimate
representatives of the community'. Until the ballots of all-
inclusive local and metropolitan elections have been counted,
community organisations will share the running of the
transitionary government with the apartheid functionaries which
they sought to destroy.1
I say that the new status of the civics is a symptom of an
anomaly, for they have earned this status, not through a process
of formal representation, but by virtue of organising those who
were denied the opportunity to be represented at all. As such,
the civics are well aware that they are only conferred the status
of "representative of the community" in order to have this status
taken away. Once a local government is elected, civics will take
their place outside of the sphere of representation in the much-
acclaimed civil society of the new South Africa.
In this context, the question "what are the civics?" is no
existential indulgence. To travel the path from organ of
resistance, to quasi-local government, to voluntary association
in the space of four years is the stuff of an identity crisis.
It unearths what is always a very fragile and difficult question:
what is representation, and more particularly, what does it
entail at the institutional level?
What makes this question even more complex is that the civic
movement has never been entirely sure that it wants a liberal
democracy at all. The notion that traditional institutions of
representation are inadequate and that grassroots organs of
resistance are the embryos of popular government was heard far
and wide during the course of the 1980s. To state then, as
unproblematically as I did, the notion that civics qua
"representatives of the community" is purely and simply a
transitional anomaly, is to deny the ambiguities at stake when
considered from the vantage point of the historical forces which
have shaped the identities of civics. The peculiarly ambitious
role vis a vis representation which civics have conferred upon
themselves, renders the unproblematic utilisation of the
oppositions "state/civil society" and "statutory body/voluntary
association" a little atrophied. The historical ambitions of the
civics blur this divide.
The task of this paper is to explore the Atteridgeville-
' S*« C
govarnMnt.
Saulsville Residents' Association's (ASRO) perception of this
divide. In other words, I wish to examine ASRO's conception of
Itself qua representative of residents under a liberal democracy. 2
Yet before doing so, I wish to set out what I believe is at
stake in this investigation through the use of an anecdote.
The End of History or the beginning of democracy
Few have been so brazen as to believe that the demise of
Stalinism in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of apartheid in
South Africa herald the beginning of The End of History. Still
fewer have been so confident as to declare themselves
protagonists in this quasi-religious revelation.
Yet this is precisely the Identity which the National Party
leadership conferred upon itself and the historical process when
it announced the inauguration of South Africa's constitutional
transition. If the NP is to be believed, the culmination of the
Cold War has reduced the substance of politics to an insipid and
banal debate over technicalities, for the burning controversies
over good government and distributive justice have been laid to
rest by the overwhelming logic of the historical process.
"Reality is visible to anyone with the ability to open their eyes
and look around",3 declared Gerrit Viljoen. Since, de Klerk
tells us, "the great debate about economic systems and over forms
of government - which dominated global politics for the ninety
years of this century - is now over. Following the collapse of
communism, it has become clear that there is really only one
broad formula for economic and political success." He continues,
without seeming to intend the irony, that "it is no longer
possible to shop around [! ] and to pick and choose economic
systems according to our ideological predilections." The only
conceivable economic system "rests on free markets, private
ownership, individual initiative".4
As if to drive home the point that he speaks for rationality and
nature, and for not contrivance and fabrication, de Klerk informs
us that this "expansion of freedom is the natural course for
mankind... It has not been devised by this or that philosopher
or political scientist. It is inherent in human nature and human
society."5 Yet still further, in case we are not impressed by
what is inherent and natural, de Klerk registers the work of a
divine hand in the political process. "I believe", says de Klerk,
1 will not tall you Buch about the organisation's history and lta caapaigna. Nor will 1 daal with
what la probably tha Boat burning, and cartalnlr tha Boat apokan of dllaua facing tha civic noveaent: tha
quaatlon of tachnlcal capacity and financa at a tlae whan tha civic movaaent gears ltaalf toward
rapraasntlng raaidants In tha raconatructlon of thalr townshlpa. Rather, the object of this paper la slsply
tha evolution of a dlacoursa. Vat. Co tha extent that thla dlacourao deflnea the Identity of the civic and
deBarcates tha contoura of lta practice, it Is deeply lapllcated In ell of Its practical concerna.
Oerrlt Viljoen. 10 nay 1990. speech to Parliament. Cape Town, translated froa the Kfrlkaana.
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"that God is the master of the fortunes of peoples and nations
and that the current events in Eastern Europe and the entire
world are not coincidental."6
In sum, the revelatory closure of the Cold War has rendered the
exigencies of economy and government "obvious to any child"'.
The inevitability of our righteous future consists of a market
economy in combination with parliamentary representation.
On the one hand, there is a very obvious sense in which the
National Party is talking nonsense, and the authors of the
statements I have quoted are well aware of that. As van Zyl
Slabbert has flippantly remarked, the overconfidence which de
Klerk exuded as he announced the transition resembles that of a
"small boy whistling casually as he walks past a cemetery in the
dusk" (Slabbert, 1992:7, translated from the Afrikaans). At the
simplest level, the N.P. had begun an irrevocable process of
enfranchising its historical enemies, and this must surely bring
with it the ultimate risk of being effaced from the political
map. Indeed, the N.P.'a insistence on inscribing a place for
itself in the future state, first through the proposition of a
veto, and then through the argument for party consociationalism,
is itself testimony to the dynamic and animated, rather than
insipid and banal, power struggle which resides in defining the
very contours of representative democracy; namely, the struggle
to determine who exactly "The People" are and in what
configuration they are to be represented.
But there, is a much more profound sense in which the birth of
representative democracy in South Africa is not, or at least
shouldn't be, the beginning of the End of History. To see why
this is so one need only invert the meanings attributed to the
end of the Cold War in the references cited above. For in this
era there is no longer any reason for black South Africans to see
their struggle within the terms of an atrophied duality between
bureaucratic dictatorship on the one hand, and an imperialist
enemy on the other. The fall of Stalinism comes at a time when
democratic citizenship need no longer entail the casting of an
empty vote and no more. In contrast to the times of n.an and of
Lenin, the logic of the contemporary representative state is
forced to heed the voices of social movements in spheres
previously designated to lie beyond the grasp of the political.
The workplace, collective consumption, gender and sexuality have
all been reshaped by that pole of a power struggle which demands
equality and liberty. Indeed, the space for contestation has
become so much wider and indeterminate that the father of
classical American pluralism, Robert A. Dahl, has recently
remarked that "there is no reason to believe that the defence of
liberty necessarily entails a defence of capitalism as we know
it" (Dahl, 1990:112).
Ibid
': 0. VUJoen. 13 February 1990. Parliament.
But this potential of the representative state to become a deeply
contested one is, of course, only a potential. Even if the
representative state is forced to engage with the struggles
created by a myriad of new voices, there is no guarantee that
these struggles and these voices need always or ever emerge. And
this is where I finally arrive at the crux of this paper's
research.
The irony of beginning a paper on ASRO with the N.P. fantasizing
its hopes about representative democracy, is not simply that they
are the mirror of the civic movement's fears. That much is
predictable. More pertinent are the dangers that lie in the
civic movement really sharing with the N.P. its conception of
representative democracy. For the history which shaped the civic
movement places it in a rather sceptical relation to
representative democracy. The danger exists that. Instead of
opening the spaces that they create for radical politics, the
civics will see in the structures of representative democracy the
same sterility and emptiness which de Klerk hopes to celebrate.
Beckoning elements of its history rather than its possible
future, there is every chance that civics will attempt to skirt
the logic of the new order and to imprint on it the fantasy of
a homogenous community, attached organically to its leadership,
and articulating a single, transparent and indomitable political
will.
Pallo Jordan (1990) has expressed fears that the survival of such
a political imaginary will place South Africa in danger of being
controlled by a Stalinist bureaucracy. I think that the opposite
is the case. If the civic movement attempts to skirt the logic
of the new order it will simply be defeated by it. Township
residents will find themselves either rubber stamping or
impotently protesting against developmental projects which will
shape their lives in spite of their political activism. The
irony is that the N.P.'s truncated view of representative
democracy and.market economies will begin to resemble reality in
far closer fashion than the N.P. itself really believed it would.
In starting this paper by indicating the outline of its
conclusions, I have baldly invoked normative assumptions which
the reader cannot be expected to take at face value. I have also
interpreted the thoughts of the ASRO leaders I have interviewed
in a manner with which they would probably take issue. It goes
without saying that a task of this paper is now to fill in these
gaps. At the theoretical level I must define what is entailed
in the notion of representative. as opposed to direct, democracy.
Moreover, I must defend the argument that, whatever forms it has
taken historically, and with whatever forms of economic
organisation it has cohabited, it is the logic of representative
democracy which harbours the potential of creating political
forces which are truly participatory and transformative in
character. At the empirical level I must illustrate why the
civic leaders I interviewed hover between working with these
potentialities on the one hand, and pining after a nostalgic
vision of a monolithic, direct democracy which will not find a
home after the transition.
Most important of all, this paper must not lapse into a polemic
against the civic or into a quasi-policy document. Although
highly interpretive in nature, the task of this paper is to trace
the evolution of an organisation's discourse over the last
decade. As such, it must allow the civic leaders to speak as
much as possible and must clearly demarcate the line at which the
civic stops speaking and I start. In this way, the paper's
normative and analytic interpretations will be left bare, and its
conclusions open to as wide a degree of discrepancy as possible.
The Ambiguities of the National Democratic Revolution
Before examining the discourse of ASRO itself it is appropriate
to explore whether there has indeed ever been a challenge to
representative democracy embodied in the identity of the South
African liberation movement. This detour is neither superfluous
nor an attempt to put the words of others into mouths of the
civic leaders I interviewed. I hope that by the end of this
paper it will become clear that the social-theoretical
ambiguities which have nourished and shaped the liberation
st i rjgle are deeply implicated in the civic's vision of its own
fuiuie. In addition, I will use this section to specify as
clearly as possible the line separating representative from
direct democracy. Since this distinction in the linchpin of my
mode of investigation, I would do well to define it before using
it to interpret.
It is well known that the notion of National Democratic
Revolution (NDR) was conceived in the structures of the Cominform
as a socialist strategy for colonial countries. It is equally
well known that in the South African context. National Democratic
strategy was first conceived under the banner of marxism-leninism
in the South African Communist Party's (SACP) 1962 programme.6
In 1969, the concept was adopted by the ANC itself, albeit it
rather hesitantly.' As the official strategy of the Congress
tradition, the term was heard far and wide inside the country
during the uprisings of the mid 1980s. By the time the
constitutional transition began in 1990, the notion of NDR was
deeply ensconced in the identities of the United Democratic
Front, and of Cosatu.
The fact that NDR was conceived under the banner of marxism-
leninism, is in itself no proof of its theoretical character.
Neil Kinnock once called himself a socialist, but nobody is
obligated to believe him. Moreover, such "proof becomes even
more Incoherent once the implication of NDR's hegemonization by
the Congress tradition becomes apparent. For, by the mid 1980s,
the currency of NDR had spread far beyond the confines of the
South African communist tradition. And of course, its
irradiation through the ranks of black opposition has meant that
its meaning has become increasingly diffuse and indeterminate.
Saa SACP. I960.
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Nevertheless, and if only as a point of departure, I wish to
begin this discussion of NDR from within the prism of the
identity conferred upon it by its own original architects; that
of marxism-leninism.
I opened this paper by attributing to statements of the National
Party the belief that the End of History was nigh. If this
attribution to the NP was a little careless and frivolous, it is
certainly neither in relation to historical materialism and the
notion of democracy which ensues from it. The vitriolic
rejections of representative democracy littered across the texts
of the marxist-leninist canon are squarely buttressed by a
distinctive theory of history. According to the latter,
historical society is moving tendentiously towards its own
annulment; the telos of history consists in an eternity in which
society is rendered entirely transparent to itself. The state
withers away, and with it, the entire edifice of "the political"
as a distinct sphere of social relations. What is left is a
homogenous entity which, as "a single body" regulates its own
existence.
Moreover, the narrative continues, if history is moving
tendentiously toward its own closure, its movement has also
created an agent imbued with the task of instituting this
closure. By virtue of its position in the capitalist relations
of production, the proletariat "lives in the truth" (Althusser,
1990:66), so to speak. The working class is epistemologically
privileged in that it is the agent which heralds the institution
of a final transparency. And it is politically privileged in
that its will and its interests promise to confer upon humanity
its universal destiny. What is required at the brink of the End
of History is the construction of a configuration of institutions
which will facilitate the realization of proletarian will by
destroying that of its enemies.
Stated in this way, the reader may well lambast this rendition
as atrophied, sterile, and ultimately erroneous. Yet claims to
greater sophistication, nuance and complexity are belied by the
theory of democracy which accompanies this conception of history.
Perhaps most illuminating in this regard is Lenin's pronouncement
on the utility of universal suffrage:
It cennot and never
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Embodied in this statement is the notion that, if taken
seriously, pluralist democracy is not only useless but
obfuscatory. When armed with a knowledge of history, the
necessary trajectory of its movement and the identity of its
universal agent, the ritual of determining people's identities
through a procedural competition is rendered nonsensical. For
representative elections can only gauge the maturation of a will
already known to historical materialism. The function of
democracy cannot possibly consist in empirically testing who
political agents are, but rather, in developing the institutions
which will best realize and express what they are necessarily
destined to become. The interests of the proletariat are
inscribed in the meaning of history and thus need not and should
not require determination through a party-political competition.
Thus while the role of suffrage in representative democracy is
to determine the will of the electorate, its role in proletarian
democracy, on the contrary, is simply to regulate the expression
of an already-constituted and transparent political will.
Universal suffrage is to be employed to "serve the people ... as
individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for
workmen and managers in his business" (Marx, 1979:221). Thus,
an analogy is drawn between the individual capitalist who selects
"the right man" for "the right Job" and the mechanism of
universal suffrage in the context of elections under proletarian
democracy.
And what are the tasks of these "right places" in proletarian
administration? "Democracy is quite needless to the proletariat
if it is not at once used as a means to further measures directly
attacking private property " (Engels, 1976:253). In other
words, democracy (qua proletarian administration) is "quite
needless" barring its function as an instrument of a single,
homogenous and pre-given political will.
To what extent does the SACP's theory of NOR replicate this
conception of history and democracy. At first glance, it seems
to do so with the fidelity and care of an acolyte. "The only
solution to contemporary global crises", avers the SACP, "lies
with the deepening and consolidation of the main historical
tendency of our epoch; the transition from capitalism to
socialism" (SACP, 1989:4). Moreover, the SACP is clear about who
the agent of this "main historical tendency" is to be: "social
and global problems can only be solved on the basis of the
working class whose objective social position makes it central
in this regard" (ibid:11). In order to reiterate the point, the
SACP informs us that the political history of the African
continent is not exempt from the laws of history in general. The
"revolutionary process in Africa", contends the SACP, will only
reach fruition if the African proletariat "is conscious of its
historic mission and is organized to promote and pursue its
immediate and long-term interests under the guidance of marxism-
leninism" (ibid:14).
Yet, to the classical repertoire of concepts concerning
proletarian universality, the South African theory of NDR adds
a rider. The specificity of South African capitalism, aver the
theorists of NDR, issues in its intrinsic dependence upon a
political relation of racial domination. "In our country ...
race and class are two sides of the same coin." (ibid:42)
It is from this characterization of the relation between
capitalism and racial domination in South Africa that the
fundamental postulates of NDR qua strategy of democratization
arise, marking an initial deviation from the "two-stage"
8conception of the path to communism. Firstly, if capitalism in
South Africa is dependent, in its very constitution, upon racial
oppression, then the struggle against racial domination is ipso
facto anti-capitalist in character. Moreover, and following this
same logic, the political identity of the entity which seize::
power from the apartheid regime, is, qua oppressed nation, ipso
facto antl-capitalist. "There can be no fundamental liberation
without full economic emancipation" (ibid:36) avers the SACP.
"Each class is riven by racial divisions and the fate of
different classes, within each racial group, is tied to the
maintenance or destruction of racial domination." In other
words, "the objective fate of the black middle sections is linked
much more with that of black workers than with their equivalent
across the colour line" (Slovo, 1976:126).
The upshot is that South African capitalism's special features
dictate that "the national democratic state is the Indispensable
basis for the advance to socialism" (SACP, 1989:33-4). And since
the prize of the National Democratic Revolution will have been
to tear from South African capitalism its life blood, ie racial
domination, the national democratic state is ipso facto a
tranaitionary state of affairs, an "extra stage" so to speak
(Hudson, 1988), in the marxist-leninist theory of history,
inserted between the transition from capitalism to socialism.
Stated in this way, NDR's allegiance to marxism-leninism is -
national democratic rider and all - palpable. The classical
telos, together with its identification of the universal agent
of history par excellence, is happily retained by the proponents
of NDR.
Yet in this context, what are we to make of the following?
The foundation of the national democratic atate will pa popular representative lnatltutlona
of governaent baaed on one-pereon. ona-vote. universal and dlract adult franchlae without
ragard to raca. aaa or property and other dlacrlnlnacorv qualifications. •• The atata will
guarantee the baalc freedoms and rights of all cltliene. euch as freedoaa of speech and
tnouQnt, Oaf thv prsBs m d or oroAfilstation, oi sov#Bcnt, of conftclftncA And rcl lotion And ful 1
trade union rlghta for workera Including the right to atrlka. (9ACP. 1989:34)
These lines are highly ambiguous. If the principles of political
expression and representation cited above constitute mechanisms
which ensure that the will of the working class majority shines
through, then indeed, they are the political forms of a stage in
a teleological process. However, it is not at all certain that
this is what is meant. The theoretical architects of the
national democratic state do not specify the functions of its
political forms and principles. Could we not Justifiably
interpret these lines rather differently? Could we not say that
the combination of universal suffrage and "basic freedoms and
rights of all citizens" implies that the national democratic
state is defined by a reluctant allusion to its own
indeterminacy? In other words, could these rights and freedoms
and these procedures not signify that at the very moment the
popular sovereign expresses its will it is "dissolved into a
numerical element..., a statistic" (Lefort, 1988:230), thus
attesting to an ultimate recognition that it is indeterminable?
In other words, the theory of NDR is left stranded between two
competing conceptions of democracy; the first, a pluralist
representative democracy and the second, a platform on which
history's privileged agent (here the oppressed nation) is to
destroy the raison d'etre of political contestation in any form.
Let us recast this same tension in another context. What is the
political status of the national democratic forces pitted against
apartheid in the 1980s? According to the contours of the tension
I have just outlined, national democratic discourse offers two
conflicting answers. The one is that the practice of resistance
has engendered a political will which renders pluralist and
representative democracy obsolete. It is within the rubric of
this logic that the grassroots institutions forged in struggle
are inscribed with lofty and universal ambitions. For they are
charged with a symbolic weight which far surpasses their identity
as organs of resistance. Instead, they are instruments which can
and must outlive the apartheid order for they constitute the site
at which the always-already present political interests of the
oppressed have become visible and expressive. As such, they are
nothing less than embryos of government:
Mot only ere we oppoeed to the preeent parliament beeauaa we ere axcludad. but because
parliaMntary-type repraaantatlon In itmm\f rapraianta a Halted and narrow ldaa of
desocracy... The radlMntary organ* of pwoplf'a poytr that have begun to eaerga in South
Africa ... rapraaant In M n y waya tha beginning of tha kind of democracy that we are
striving for (UOP dlscuaalon docuatent. cited in Korowlti. 1990:21-2. original aaphaaea).
Yet the second answer to the question which emerges from national
democratic discourse is a good deal less comfortable with the
notion that the practice of resistance forged a political will
which was always-already present in the logic of South African
history. As such it is less comfortable with the notion that
what will replace apartheid are organs of governance which efface
pluralist contestation from the exercise of power. And in this
sense, the second answer ipso facto defends a conception of
representative democracy.
In what sense does it do this? If democracy resides in the
governance of "the will of the people", and yet if the real
identity of this will is never fixed, but rather, is always a
site of contestation, then the "will of the people" can never
express itself directly, but can only exist as a conflict between
competing representations as to its true character. In other
words, what is implicated in the notion of representivity is that
political allegiances are not inscribed a priori in the nature
of society, but are the contingent outcome of a contest.
And if this is so then the organs of resistance which united
those excluded from the democratic process cannot double up as
future organs of government. On the contrary, democracy in South
Africa must Inaugurate Itself by questioning this very unity, in
the form of institutions which insist that popular sovereignty
can only express itself through a never-ending process of
contestation over allegiances.
ASRO in the 1980s: no crystal ball
10
So much for this theoretical dilemma in the SACP. To what
extent, if any, does it inform the identity of the civic movement
in the 1980s?
At first glance it is perhaps obvious that civic culture during
the 1980s was deeply anti-pluralist in character. Aside from the
fact that the majority of civics were formally aligned to a
single political tradition (charterism), the structural character
of civics assumed homogeneity as a necessary condition of
political action. While decentralised into area and sometimes
street committees for the purposes of deeper participation,
administrative capability and, after 1985, as a tactic to
buttress against state harassment, the overwhelming logic of the
political process envisaged a Rousseauian mass assembly of
residents producing a single political voice.
Conservative detractors have mooted this point as ultimate
testimony to the anti-democratic identity of the civic movement.
Yet in the context of both the absence of representative
democracy, and the brutal attacks directed at those who dared to
fight dictatorship, the notion that structures of resistance
could have, or indeed, should have, opened themselves to
procedural pluralism, is a little ridiculous. Instead of bald
pronouncements vis a vis the inefficacy of Rousseauian democracy,
the historicity of civic identity should be probed.
I can think of three possible identities which civics could have
conferred upon themselves during the course of the 1980s. The
first is an entirely political-instrumental conception; civics
are vehicles through which the local structures of apartheid are
to be destroyed. Or, what amounts to the same thing, civics are
"shock troops" of the liberation struggle.
Within this position there is, of course, scope for enormous
tactical variation. In his opening address to the Kabwe
conference in 1985, Oliver Tambo spoke of civics shaping
residents into an insurrectionary formation, to be conjoined with
military forces in a violent onslaught against the regime (ANC,
1985:10). In contrast, one of the ASRO leaders I interviewed
envisaged civics bringing a fully-constituted apartheid state to
the negotiating table through continuous campaigns of civil
disobedience.
Tactically, these conceptions are gulfs apart, but I bring them
under one category for the purposes of this discussion. For what
is common to them is the notion that the creation of a homogenous
and unified body politic, articulated through structures of mass
democracy, is simply a conjunctural phenomenon. The community
constitutes itself into a single political will, only by virtue
of an external enemy which defines it as such. The longevity of
civics qua "sole and legitimate representatives of the people"
is entirely contingent on the continued existence of the
apartheid regime.
In other words, what is expressed through the voice of the civic
is not a transparent and universal will per excellence, but a
11
will deeply aware of the historicity and parochiality of its
conditions of enunciation. In this sense, the political
mythology engendered by organisation is decisively inorganic in
the nature of its self-construed horizons. These horizons are
confined within the contours of apartheid and no more. Forms of
social and political expression to replace apartheid are in no
way implied by or embodied in the contours of contemporary
township organisation. This latter acquires its intelligibility,
only within the political imaginary of racial dictatorship.1*
The second position is that organs of township resistance double
up as organs of government, progressively encroaching on the
terrain of state sovereignty at the local level. At the level
of representation, the local government is boycotted, and
residents, qua democratic sovereign, converge instead in the
structures of the civic. The civic also encroaches upon
administrative functions, skirting official law enforcement for
instance, and replacing it with structures of popular justice.11
In so far as this second position can be read as embodying the
logic of the first, it does not contradict it. The establishment
of alternative representative and administrative forums marks a
refusal to be registered in the state's discourse on democracy
and representation. In this sense, there is no reason why the
alternative structures which arose to punctuate the illegitimacy
of officialdom should not equally be construed as oppositional
entitles whose efficacy simply resides in the continued existence
of the apartheid state. In other words, the civic qua
representative, and people's courts qua organs of Justice are
only so in the absence of and the struggle for democracy.
The third position, in contrast, does not see the emergence of
a homogenous and unitary voice as historlcised by the existence
of an enemy, which will disagregate with the destruction of that
enemy. On the contrary, it posits this homogenous will as a
universal and transcendental potentially whose full constitution
Is denied by the existence of the enemy. In this conception,
organs of resistance assume a double identity. At the one pole
of this identity, their raison d'etre is the destruction of
apartheid. Yet, at the other pole, their task is to outlive and
replace apartheid structures. The Rousseauian notion of a people
assembling to express a single and irrepressible voice is not
historicised by apartheid, but universalised by its own
"" A variant of this position la lucidly artlculatad by Khahla shubana: "colonlally doalnatad paoplas
ara laft no cholca but to gravlcat* togathar In llbaratlon aovaMnta and oppoaa thalr opprasalon.. . [But]
tha aovaaant ltaalf Bust accapt that It aroaa as a raault of apaclflc hlatorlcal clrcuastancsa and that one*
thaaa changa tha llbaratlon aovaaant-atyla of polltlca auat ba allowad to lapsa aa wall" (Shubana. 1992:37-
6). Ha goaa on to advocata that tha llbaratton aovaaant dlsagragata Into a pluralltf of political partial
and voluntary aasoclatlons (lbld:38-9|.
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aabltlon. Rathar. It waa forgad 'by slapla nacaaalty" dua to tha gaps laft by hopslaaaly lnadaquata
policing undar apsrthald. Indaad. tha arguaent contlnuaa. lnatltutlona of lnfomsl township Juatlca far
pracadad tha birth tha civic aovaaant undar a daaply consarvatlva laadarahip. Yat, aa Haysklao (1993J
arguaa. whlla It aay ba trua that tha aaarganca of paopls'a courta bora tasrlnony to tha lnadaqu«cy of
aparthald policing, tho notion that It can ba aaparatad froa tha lapulaa to daatroy aparthald In tha Bid
1980a la rldlculoua.
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transcendental invincibility. In this sense, the organisational
forms of the present are the governmental forms of the future.12
Which of these three positions did the ASRO leadership adopt
during the 1980s? Both Seekings (1993) and Swilling (1994) have
warned us against attributing grandiose claims to local civic
structures. Civics, they tell us, were more preoccupied with the
mechanics of organisation-building than with universal questions
of national democracy. I will discuss later whether this sort
of path of enquiry is a wise one at all. For the moment however,
let us say that at first glance this sentiment seems absolutely
correct:
When AfliO wee launched at tha and of 19B3 we mvtr dreast that the and of aparthald waa
a littla M r * than el* yeera down tha Una. 3o wa navar really gave a thought to how we
would govern- Would tha civic bacosa a new local government? Really, during tha 1980a
that question waa ao abatract that nobody botharad to aak It. It waa qulta aaanlnglaaa
(raapondant 2 ) . "
And another ASRO leader:
Our energy waa focuaad entirely on gattlng rid of tha regime. And when wa focuaad
eleewhere It waa on how to prevent the rag 1 M fro» gattlng rid of ua. Tha thing about
b«lng In tha aldat of a llfa-and-daath war la that you cannot possibly aaa paat It--. Wa
unltad tha coaamnity to throw off tha yoke of aparthald. What tha coasunlty would look
Ilka aftar daaocrecy was an acadeslc quaatlon. The altuatlon did not allow ua to addraaa
It (raapondant 1).
I probed the activists I interviewed a little further. In the
mid-1980s a Marx-Lenin reading group was established amongst the
civic leadership. Did activists not learn something from the
notion of dual power - that organs of resistance would, after the
revolution, be transformed into Soviets which would replace
parliamentary representation, and herald the birth of a new
democracy?
•aadlng Kant and Lanln aervad an e*tr«amly lnportant educative function for ui. but not
In tha «ana« you ara talking about. Yaa, wa read about aovlat democracy and about tha
M really got out of Mara and especially Lanln was tha art of leaderahlp In struggle. You
have to read tha conjuncture vary carafully on a day to day level. What la tha aood of
tha people? Where ara tha probleae In our constituency? How strong Is the enemy? What
la Its greataat point of weakness? These are tha questions which our raadlng brought to
our attention. It showed us that leadership la s very difficult art. that with bad leaders
tha struggle is lost 1 respondent 1).
While most civic leaders articulated the belief that the future
was unsighted from the vantage-point of the 1980s, what was
abundantly clear in activists minds was the identity of the civic
as an organ of the liberation struggle:
Why did we fora reeldente' eesoclatlona In opposition to the fornatton of BLAe (Black Local
Authorities]? You auat understand that, first and foraaoat. wa Identified ourselves with
a national movement to destroy apartheid. Sons of our people ... were Involved In tha
Impending formation of tha Unltad Democratic rront. And together with others ecrose the
country wa racognimd black local government •• the weak link In the apartheid chain. 3o
attacking tha BLAe was a crucial part of destroying apartheid. In positioning ourselves
klao. 1992.
Perhepa now is an appropriate tine for a brief word on methodology. Tha data-base of the this paper
consists of four interviews: two with the founding chsirpereon and vice chairperson of ASRO. and two with
the present general secretary and chsirpereon. All four respondents have been ectlve members of the civic
* rom lta inception unt 11 the preeent. 1 have referenced them AS rttEPPP^fmta 1 tfi ^  In no Identifiable
order.
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ae an alternative th* BLAa wa war* asking th« point that thay were corrupt duaay
structures, that wa would not atop fighting until wa have real democratic administration
(respondent 2).
And another activist:
After tha ao-call«d raforas of 19B2 It became clear to ua that the d Hennas of realdenta
war* going to highlight tha atrocities of apartheid such aora visibly than before. Tha
African ghettos ware now legislatively considered econoalca unto themselves. Yet our
people's labour and purchasing powar waa Integral to the social product of Metropolitan
aconoalaa. And after COBIng hoaa froa asking thsa* aatropolltan economies what they were,
residents found that they war* to fund their own ghattoe. The BLAs ware to be given
taxation powers as if they controlled an aconoalc Island. And aa tha new legislation caaa
through, so th* basr halls war* privatliad. The only eourcs of income left to tha BLAs
was rant. So even in advance, wa knew vary well that rents were going to spiral and
spiral. With thss* naw raforas. w« would have bean irresponsible not provoke a response
froa residents. Tha BLA* war* tha aost glaring and painful aoaent of the apartheid
Monstrosity. In this sans* it waa th* weak link in the chain. It aada life unbearable
(respondent 4).
Thinking back to the three possible civic identities with which
this section of the paper began, it seems quite clear that the
ASRO leadership steered clear of the third viz. that the civic
was a rudimentary organ of government. The leadership was deeply
aware that residents were united under the rubric of a single
political project only by virtue of their common exclusion from
representation. In this sense, the structure of the political
process under the rubric of the civic was inscribed with a
tactical and hlstoricised function. Beyond the prism of the
apartheid imaginary, it had little or no meaning.
Yet this statement roust be tempered by the meanings inscribed in
the second category of civic identity; that of a representative
which encroaches upon the arenas of state sovereignty. While the
future may indeed have been unsighted from the trenches of
resistance, the exercise of establishing counter and quasi state
functions was surely imbued with a significance beyond the
confines of tactical initiative:
If wa *r* talking slaply about tactics, than of cours*. the goal la that tha whole
coaaunity abstain froa rent payasnts
until the day that apartheid rsnts do not sxlat. 8ut aa Important is tha process through
which residents arrive at asying: "Wa will not fund your dummy structures with our wages"
(respondent 3).
And examining the significance of this process a little further:
Tha vary existence of these rants is tha product of people having no decision-asking power
over their own lives. So ther*for* th* exercise of th* rent boycott aust begin to build
precisely what is lacking: participatory democracy. Thia la why •*• decantrellied Into
area coamltteee. Obviously th* whole coaaunity cannot ask* a meaningful decision by
assembling in on* forum without prior discussion. 3o our structures had to reach Into every
street. Nothing of significance could be allowed to occur without everyone feeling: "This
wa* ay decision". Our structures would have bean hollow if we had simply borrowed soae
Ideas from a group of left-wing intellectuals. Th* process had to express the feet thst
everyone has tha knowledge to run their own lives (respondent 4|.
This logic extended to the exercise of administrative functions
as well:
Th* amailng thing about people's courta la that ordinary people began to reallie that tha
aophiatlcatad language of lawyara spoke of what they already knew. People know right from
wrong. Thay Just never reallied that institutions could be forged around what they know:
h^fflr Institutions. Obviously murder caaes ware handed over to the police. But In
domestic disputes and crime wa were Incredibly successful. At times th* police asked us
to aolv* cases- One* th* district surgson wrote sent a letter congratulating ua on our
role in lowering the crime rat* (raapondent 4).
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And perhaps most important of all:
In this aenae. I Buppoee that our experience did create aone rudimentary prlnclplea for
the future. After the experience of people'a education. 1 don't think our people will ever
eccept their echoole being run without the lnvolveaent of PTSAa. And why ehould democracy
atop et the education of our children? We thought, why can't people alao be Involved in
the delivery, not Just reception, of health care, for lnetance? Thoae we heady deya.
Looking back, perhepa we were too aabltloue. But eone aolld prlnclplee were built, and
we. would have waated eoMthing precloua If we loet eight of the* (reapondent 4).
At this level, the practices generated by establishing an array
of institutions outside the ambit of the regime certainly bore
the mark of an alternative. Yet it must be stressed that in the
minds of activists this "alternative" never crystallized into the
idea of a specific institutional formation. Rather, what the
experience of opposition generated was "rudimentary principles".
What did these principles specify? Essentially, a deepening of
the political; the notion that an array of social relations
previously designated to lie either in the incontestable sphere
of the private, or in the equally incontestable sphere of
unilateral administrative action, were to be redefined and
reshaped by the demand for participation. In other words, what
was already rejected by the civic was the notion that the
political consists of a narrow and localized space above society,
which citizens can only access by crossing a ballot. Instead the
discourses of equality and participation must imprint themselves
ubiquitously across the social through various forms of citizen
action. In this sense, the practices of civic organisation
certainly spoke to the future; but only cryptically.
For, stated at the level of rudimentary principle, this notion
of the "ubiquity of the political" presents a truncated story.
Its real import only emerges once it is conferred meaning by its
attachment to specific institutional and philosophical forms.
In illustration, the classical marxism spoken of earlier is
perhaps best defined by its illumination of the ubiquity of the
political. What was previously designated to be the work of a
rational market was unveiled by marxism as an arena shaped by
power and coercion. Yet this illumination was articulated to a
vision of history which saw a universal solution in the
dictatorship of a particular group of social agents. In
contrast, the work of Robert Dahl which I quoted earlier,
envisages the irradiation of the democratic principle through
opening more and more avenues to an indeterminate, unpredictable
pluralist contestation in increasingly numerous spheres of life.
In this sense, the political principles generated by civic
activity remained open-ended. Certainly at the level of the
leadership's explicit thinking, the articulation of principles
to an institutional configuration of political expression
remained indeterminate. This was essentially, "an academic
question".
Into the 1990s - the mass meeting and the ballot
At this point however, a certain Inconsistency in the civic
leaders' perceptions of the organisation's function and identity
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becomes apparent. In what follows It will become clear that the
articulation of principle to a vision of a specific political
process with visible contours, was not quite as open-ended and
indeterminate as the words of the civic leadership imply. For
in discussing the place of the civic after the transition, an
image of representation and participation which very obviously
bears the imprint of politics in the 1980s, emerges from the
discourse of ASRO leaders.
What I am registering then, seems to be an anomaly. In the
references above, the civic leadership was vociferous in
rejecting any universal or transcendental claims to its Identity.
Instead, it adamantly insisted on its historical inscription into
the political logic of apartheid; so much so in fact, that it
insisted on the opacity of the future. And yet, in the very same
interviews, a clearly contoured vision of the future, based
largely on the shape of organisation in the past, is articulated.
Later in this paper, I will attempt to explore why a vision
remained concealed and unspoken in discussing the 1980s, and yet,
in discussing the 1990s, emerged in a manner which illustrates
abundantly that it was always-already present. Indeed, I think
that if it is possible to get to grips with the logic of such
silences and omissions, something of the nature of political
transition is revealed. And in this sense, the conditions of
emergence of "the new" become more intelligible. For the moment
however, let us explore the nature of this vision.
The civic leaders began to articulate the ralson d'etre of the
continued existence of the civic after apartheid with what has
become, over the last few years, a very familiar rhetoric:
Thara «uat ba a atrong and vibrant civil aoclatv. for thla la tha varlabla that will anaura
tha auccaaa of daaocracy In South Afrlca'a political aquation. Wa auat not rapaat alatakaa
aada alaavhara whara avarythlng waa eollapaad into ona paopla'a aovaaant... Thoaa in
govarnaant auat ba plttad againat civil aoclatv to anaura that authoritarian tandanclaa
do not allp Into thla dasocratlc aaparlaant of oura (raapondant 4).
And further:
Clvlca auat aurvlva tha tranaltloh bacauaa tha tncoalng govarnaant suat haar tha volca of
tha paopla vary loudly. Daaocraev Mill M a n nothing in raal tana without tha contlnuad
atrugglaa of popular aovaaanta (raapondant 2).
All that can be gleaned so far is that "the voice of the people"
is to echo at its truest and most formidable outside of the
formal structures of .sovereignty: or at very least, that a
condition of the representivity of the formal structures of
sovereignty, resides in the presence of a voice outside of their
ambit. This is an important point which we will later deal with
at length, but let us note for the moment that in itself it does
not tell us very much. What is at stake and yet is thus far
unsaid, is, of course, the political status of "the voice of the
people" and the institutional configuration which befits it.
This issue is perhaps most fittingly Introduced by the manner in
which the ASRO leadership responded to challenges to its
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representivity as it began to negotiate the terms of rent and
service charges at the beginning of the transition:
At tha beginning of the rent/alactriclty procaee. ASRO »•• viewed aa tho aola and authentic
rapreaentatlve of tha coaaunlty. That eaeae Ilka language fron a long tine ago. But of
couraa. It waa trua. Ho ona alaa waa brava enough. We were arreeted and detained under
tha emergency: thara waa a tlae whan you had to be very courageoua to repreaent the
coawunity. and thia waa raapected... Oura waa a liberation platfom. not a Juet a rent
platfora. And It waa on thia platfora that we won tha haarta of the people (reapondent
1).
Yet with the inauguration of the transition:
... It euddenly bacaaa vary aaay to ba a repreeentativa of tha conaunlty. A range of
fonatlona that wara previously vary <|ulat atartad auahrooalng. we navar had any problema
taking our poaitlona In nagotlatlona back to tha comunlty through araa coaaitteea and aaaa
l d h
p y
etlngs. But AZAPO. tha PAC and tha Hlnlatara Pratamity of Attaridgavllla auggeatad
l
haty  
bacauae of ASIO'B fraternal ra atlonahlp with tha tripartite alliance, we wara aactari
Thay aaid wa naadad non-aactarian rapraaantation. Wa ahould either diatanca ouraalvaa f roa
tha actlvitlaa of tha alliance, or aach liberation aoveaant ahould hava a civic, when it
got to tha ataga of auggastlng sanding aavaral dalagationa to tha nagotiatlona. wa aald.
"Itlka. that lan't going to happan." 9o. wa all bandlad together in ona delegation and
triad to C O M to ona position. But quite frankly, it Juat Bade tha procaaa aassy and
cooplicatad.
What emerges in ASRO discourse then with the advent of varying
claims to representivity is a bifurcation of political leadership
into the "authentic" and the "unauthentic". Moreover, the gauge
of authenticity is established by a backward glance into 1980s;
those who led the community to the destruction of apartheid have
earned the authority to represent the community in the
transition. In contrast, the ambitions of those who wish to lay
leadership claims only now, once the transition has already
started, are cast as the work of an artifice; claims to
representivity have "suddenly become easy". They need no longer
be buttressed by an authentic connection to the community's
political will.
Yet significantly the logic of this belief extends past the
transition and into the future. All four interviewees insisted
that, after the transition, Atteridgeville-Saulsville residents
remain organised under one civic, and that latter retain the
structure that characterised it in the 1960s viz. area
committees, a general council and an executive. Moreover, all
four interviewees advocated that the civic leadership bifurcate
itself Into those who run for local government and those who
remain behind to staff the "organ of civil society".
Why should the civic leaders of the 1980s occupy the local
government of the 1990s? Because "those who sacrificed where
others compromised must run the new local government" (respondent
3). Moreover, if civic leadership of the 1980s does occupy a
significant place in local government, "tensions between
government and the people won't really be a problem because they
[ex-civic local government councillors] will be able to get out
there with the civic to explain to the community what is going
on" (respondent 3).
Once again then, what emerges is the notion of a single voice
resonating from the community, but only insofar as the latter is
represented bv its authentic leadership - which in turn is gauged
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by looking back to the moment when the community constituted
Itself qua political entity; ie, in the struggles which marked
the birth and growing hegemonic position of ASRO.
Yet if the civic leadership can indeed initiate a seamless
process of representation by occupying the new local government,
why the need for a voice outside of local government; ie, what
then is the raison d' etre of the continued existence of the
civic? I will cite two reasons given to me by the civic
leadership:
After apartheid, aunlclpalttlee and aatropolltan areae will of eourae ba non-racial. And
tha paopla who partlctpata In local govemaant will C O M tram verioue political atranda.
Moreover, local governaant will probably reflect a continuation of tha power-ehering
arrangaaant at tha national level. Thla national unity govemaent la good and nacaaaarr
bacausa It forcaa all playere to abandon polnt-acorlng and gat on with tha lowaat coaaon
denoalnator of raconatructlon. But It aay alao produco authoritarian tandanclaa. Thla
la why thoaa In governaant auat ba plttad agalnat civil aoclaty (raapondant 4).
And the second reason:
Thoaa In governaent will ba torn batwaan a ranga of dlffarant forcaa. Tha World Bank la
a vary powerful lnatltutlon. and tha local govarnaent Bay find It too coapalllng to raalat
thalr arguaanta. 9o, thara la tha poaalblllty that local govarnaant won*t alwaya dallvar.
Tharafora tha civic auat atlll ba out thara to aoblllta tha paopla. to aarch agalnat tha
local govarnaant. But flrat wa auat axhauat all channala: a daaocratlc govomaant will
obvloualy provlda laportant channala which tha aparthald govarnaant cloaad off (raapondant
1).
In short, the logic of local government, both in its
constitution, and in its tasks, mitigates against any assurance
that the political will of the community be hegemonic there.
Thus, the raison d'etre of the civic consists in demarcating an
institutional space outside of local government in which the
community's will is best expressed, and from which it can "pit
itself against local government", if necessary. However, let me
say again, at the risk of unnecessary repetitiveness, that this
"political will of the community" is nothing if not attached to
its organic leadership:
why auat aoaa of tha laadarahlp atay bahlnd in tha clvlc7 Bacauaa If wa all want to local
govarnaant opportunlata would coaa In and hijack tha civic. .. It would no longer repraaant
tha eoaaunity (raapondant 3).
In what forms will the people, organised in the structures of the
civic, make their voice heard to the local government? All four
interviewees spoke of a myriad of different forms. But one in
particular has stuck in my mind. I hope that I do not valorise
its significance unjustifiably, but perhaps the reader can Judge
this through the course of the argument.
I asked all four interviewees to envisage a scenario in which the
World Bank initiates a housing scheme in Atterldgeville, and
begins to negotiate the terms of its implementation with the
local government. What relationship between the Bank, the local
government and the civic should arise from such a development
project? In what way should the local government consult those
affected by it? The following was muted by one interviewee and
endorsed by all the others.
Tha comaratona of thla proceaa la thorough conaultatlon. 9o. for lnatance. 1 would argua
that tha local governaent. In conjunction with tha civic, call a aaia Beating of all
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raeidenta. and that wa teke our diractlon froa thera (reapondent 3).
Should the decisions of this mass meeting have binding power over
the local government, or is it simply an information and
education forum?
Hall, obvloualy It won't hava foraal declalon-maklng power: It will be a conaultatlve
forua. lut avan ao. It will carry too such weight and legltlnacy for the local government
to ignore ita authority. For inatanca - we gat a propoaal Iron the world Bank, wa take
it to a aaaa Meting. There, wa gat eoae direction ~ a aanaa of whet the people on the
ground think of thla propoeal. Than we go back to our workahopa to aaa if what the people
want ia feeelble. Xf It lan't. than wa auat go back to enother aaea seating and explain
why. If wa can't explain why. than wa obvioualy loaa lagltlaecr. and the people begin to
orflanlaa protaat agelrtat thla particular houalng acheaa (reapondent 3).
Let us say at the outset that the relationship envisaged here is
not a consultative one between a formal representative authority
and a voluntary association of civil society. Rather, it
represents a tussle between two competing conceptions of
democracy.
On the one hand, the institutional logic of the local government
expresses the sovereignty of the people, only by Implicitly
acknowledging that it will never appear in a fully-constituted
form. In other words, the party-pluralistic structure of the
local government lpso facto insists that the sovereignty of its
constituency only emerges in so far as it is contested; the
"will of the people" expresses itself through competing claims
to representivlty. The community is represented only by virtue
of competing claims about its identity and its will.
In other words, the logic expressed here is that of the
representative democracy which I spoke of earlier. The very
notion that democracy must be "representative" rather than
"direct", is grounded in a fundamental uncertainty; political
wills cannot appear on the political stage in their naked and
transparent positivity. On the contrary, they only appear at all
in so far as they are the object of competing claims; in so far
as they are the object of a myriad of representations. This is
why, in contradistinction to direct democracy, representative
democracy insists that government constitutes itself, not simply
by deferring its authority to its constituency, but by doing so
under the rubric of a pluralistic conflict. The underlying
assumption is the impossibility of the emergence of a single and
inviolable will.
Yet mooted by the leaders of the civic is a vision in which the
representative government submits itaelf to the authority of a
forum with an entirely different symbolic efficacy. Here, the
people assemble in a single body, and, in the spirit of ancient
Greek democracy, collectively produce a single will. In other
words, at the moment that the local government submits to the
authority of community meeting which issues a single voice, it
sacrifices the efficacy of its own logic; a logic which insists
that mandates only emerge from a pluralist dynamic of competing
claims.
It is in this sense that at the heart of the civic leadership's
conception of "real participation and power" is the notion that
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representative democracy must not simply be supplemented by other
forms, but that at crucial moments, its logic must be effaced by
other logics. The raison d'etre of party pluralism can and must
be effaced at the moment a homogenous will emerges to make it
redundant. At such times, the local government need not refer
to the mandate it received from the counting of ballots, but
instead, to the mandate of an assembly in which the will of the
people expresses itself directly, with no mediation.
This is why I said much earlier that the civic finds itself
tempted to skirt the logic of the new order, and to imprint on
it the functions of another. There is a sense in which the civic
has universalised the logic of representation which evolved under
the leadership of ASRO during the 1980s, extended its efficacy
beyond the function it served under apartheid, and heralded it
as the a cornerstone of the democracy of the new order.
Unicltv. participation and democracy
Yet to observe that the ASRO leadership has envisaged an
uncomfortable cohabitation of two conflicting conceptions of
democracy, is of course not in itself a critique. Nor is it a
critique to point out that the civic wishes to transport the
democratic culture it developed under apartheid into the future.
What is stake is the scope for "real participation and power"
offered by the prospect of all residents being represented by a
single body.
Certainly, the idea of a "vibrant civil society" mooted by the
civic leaders is motivated by the conviction that, in and of
themselves, representative democratic institutions narrow, or
even mutilate, the scope for widespread participation in the
impending process of reconstruction. As one interviewee put it:
Yaa. th* World Bank and the IMF will COB*, lut their work *uat b* dona with th* raclplanea
aa full partlclpanta. A cornaratona of auccaaa will ba full lnvolvaaant. not Juat
conaultatlon... Participation la th* only comaratan* of tha auccaaa In South Kfrlca'a
political aquation... Whatever legleletlve and aaacutlv* **aaurae ara Introducad. eha
guiding principle *uat b* th* full lnvolvaaant of tha peopl* (reepondant f).
Stated in this manner such a statement is surely laudable. The
notion that citizens hand over their futures to regional and
national parliaments on the brink of democracy is indeed a sure
way of leaving vast tracts of society untouched by the democratic
experience. That citizen formations emerge from the social
relations in which their lives are shaped is surely a sine qua
non of igniting a transformative process. That the powers of
state and finance find themselves confronted by participatory
demands in every sphere of their activity is surely desirable.
Yet the notion that what must emerge from this process of
throwing social relations open to question is a single voice,
transmitting a single will, is surely perplexing. Khehla Shubane
and Pumla Madiba (1992) have expressed doubt that a single
residents' association can reflect and represent the diversity
of interests and demands which constitute township life. Yet
surely more ominous is the necessary inverse; that a myriad of
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demands voiced from various social relations will never find
institutional expression.
Indeed, it seems that ASRO is victim to the very concerns it
expresses about the limits of representative democracy. If a
fiction of parliament is its notion that an entire society is
embodied in one sovereign forum, surely the notion that a single
structure embodies an entire township echoes the fantasy. The
"will of the community" which emerges from such a political
landscape, surely masks the relations of power entailed in
producing a single voice across a myriad of social relations. For
the gradations which separate those residents who participate,
and those who don't, which separate those versed in political
discourse, and those who aren't, will be rendered invisible by
the institutional necessity of homogeneity. The insistence on
homogeneity will surely surreptitiously silence as much as it
voices.
What is threatened is precisely the "deepening of the political"
discussed earlier. I posited at the beginning of this paper that
democracy in the representative state potentially ramifies well
beyond the ballot box, that the emergence of organised movements
from an increasing plurality of social relations can rise to
challenge the unilateral initiatives of market capital and state
administration. I also posited later on that ASRO articulated
a similar "deepening of the political" in its vision of a culture
of organised participation of citizens in collective consumption.
Justice, and various other arenas.
Yet surely this gesture towards an expanding politicization is
all but annulled by the form in which the civic insists that it
occurs. For the Insistence that democratization arrives in the
form of uniclty, rather than diversity, invites a process in
which the politicization of a myriad of social relations is
buried and forgotten under the voicing of others.
Of course, there is no necessary reason why, for instance, the
demands of squatters for formal shelter should be severed from
the demands of tenants for home ownership. But just as important,
there is no a priori reason why these two demands should co-exist
in an organic unity. If two such demands are to cohabit a single
political project, surely this must be the contingent outcome of
a tactical arrangement which recognises the integrity of both,
and thus can be broken at any such time that one or the other is
threatened. To dissolve both into the notion of "the voice of
the people" is potentially to lose sight of the specificity of
either, and of the specificity of the social relations from which
they emerge.
Yet the civic insists that "because the very idea of land
invasions was conceived in the MDM, the struggles of squatters
cannot be separated from the struggles of other residents"
(respondent 2). The notion emerges once again that the unity
formed under the logic of a liberation struggle is an organic and
timeless unity in so far as it is welded together by the
"correct" political leadership.
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Implicit in the civic'3 vision of the future is that if civil
society emerges in the form of political pluralism and
antagonism, ie, if it sheds the character conferred upon politics
under apartheid, its efficacy will somehow be effaced.
Tactics, localism and political mythology
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this investigation of ASRO
consists in the silent and unregistered manner in which the
civic's vision of democracy emerged. Earlier, I went to great
lengths to illustrate that the civic's vision of itself mutated
according to the time-span of which it spoke. Vis a vis the
1980s, the interviewees spoke of the civic in terms of temporary
and historically contingent horizons; the civic was only
intelligible as an organ of resistance - inscribed in its
identity was the absence of democracy in South Africa rather than
the embodiment of democracy in the future. Indeed, from the
vantage point of an organ of resistance, the future, ie the
contours of democracy, was unsightable.
And yet, in speaking of the 1990s, it is clear that something
very different is at stake. Here, the structures, culture and
leadership of resistance have welded the community into a
substantive unity. Moreover, this unity is assigned a cardinal
political importance; it is to carve out an Independent
institutional form, outside of the structures of formal
sovereignty, in order to watch and, where necessary, intervene
against the latter. It is almost as if the unity forged under
resistance is said to embody the pristine epicentre of democracy ;
its purest and most crucial ingredient.
I wish to conclude by attempting to Investigate the logic of this
seeming anomaly. On what grounds are we to understand this
unregistered, unacknowledged impulse to preserve, at all costs,
the legacy of a practice developed under apartheid? This task
requires invoking a subject I alluded to in the introduction to
this paper; political mythology.
Earlier I referenced Mark Swilling warning against attributing
any grandiose Ideological motives to local civic organisation.
"The fact that local civics shared the 'national democratic'
langauge of the UDF", Swilling argues, "does not mean that this
language defined every aspect of organisational activity. In
fact, civics ... tended to spend far more time dealing with local
grievances in terms that differed from locality to locality and
were often specific to local circumstances and culture". And so
he concludes that "the practice of myth making fshould noti mask
the nuances of what really happened" (Swilling, 1994:5,9 emphasis
added).
Precisely what Swilling is referring to remains allusive, but
what seems to emerge is the notion that the "true" character of
political action is somehow obfuscated by the stories which are
told about it. If we cast these stories from our field of
vision, ie, if we remove the "mask" of myth making, we find
ourselves in full view of "what really happened". Obscured
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behind myths exists the pristine reality of "the local",
"specificity" and "the parochial".
This idea that political reality presents itself with greater
integrity once the myths that cluster around it are removed,
requires some examination. Ironically, I think that the notion
of a duality between myth and action is itself obfuscatory, since
it robs us of the capacity to appreciate the character of
political transition. In contrast to Swilling, I wish to posit
that myth is constitutive of political action, in so far as the
latter is entirely meaningless - and therefore impossible -
outside of the narratives which those who partake in it
construct.
For instance, the practice of boycotting rent, or, for that
matter, of staging a march on the local authority, is only
intelligible in so far as those who embark on the action have a
certain "history", "community" and "enemy". In what sense are
these notions myths? Precisely in the sense that they reside
only in the historicity of the actions which they define. At the
level of political identity, this "history", "community" and
"enemy" did not exist prior to, and might not exist after, the
era of the rent boycott. In this sense, an era is only
intelligible as an era, by virtue of the myths which mark out its
contours.
And it is precisely because these era-making myths are the very
myths which constitute "who we are" (qua political actors), that
political transformation - from dictatorship to democracy, for
instance - can never simply be thought at the level of tactics;
can never simply be thought at the level of a rational actor who
somehow stands outside of history and its myths, and charts out
the future to the dictates of a pure volition.
To make the same point in different words, the project of
fundamentally altering political practice takes on a magnitude
and complexity which defies any notion of a seamless and cogent
progression. For entailed in the alteration of practice is the
gradual effacement of "histories", "communities" and "enemies"
and their gradual replacement with a new logic of mythical
construction.
It is in this sense that the politics of epochal change is
perhaps counter-intuitive, that it is often characterised by
periods of violence associated with the blurring of meaning. For
between the loss of particular markers of certainty and the
emergence of new ones "there exists something very close to
Hobbes' state of nature. Obviously, changes would be speedier
if one social order is simply substituted by others. But
transitions are never like that You create a no-man's land
in which everyone's identity is very much in the balance"
(Laclau, 1993:70).
And it is in this same sense that the seeming anomaly of a civic
writing its future while simultaneously claiming its incapacity
to write it, becomes intelligible. For, to argue that "the
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future is unsightable" is perhaps to argue that there is no way
to make it intelligible without gesturing towards the markers of
the present, which is precisely what the civic has done.
In this context, the process of unbundling a liberation movement
into the inauguration of a pluralist culture is indeed a
momentous one. This is not to argue that the transition from
dictatorship to democracy need take place behind the backs of
political leadership. Nor is it to argue that the beginning of
the new need necessarily be warped and stunted by the confused
and stubborn dogma of the ghoat of the old. Yet to ask the civic
to shed its history in one fell swoop, and to envisage another
in the same motion, is to fall prisoner to the illusion that such
transformations can simply be willed by a tactical impulse.
In other words, the first possible civic identity which I muted
some time earlier - that of a simple instrument of a hlstorlcised
and temporary process - is perhaps never really a viable
definition of any political practice. To the extent that such
practices embody myths which constitute a reality, they cannot
simply be effaced by a tactical mutation.
But if this is so, what then is entailed in the institutional
transformation characteristic of transitions? What is the logic
of the process of unbundling a liberation movement? I wish to
explore this question through the prism of one particular
interview which I conducted. Indeed, if I were to end this paper
without separating out this interview from the others, I would
have presented my research in a stilted and inaccurate form. For
although it arrives at the same conclusions as the other
interviews vis a vis a single civic taking Atteridgeville
residents into the future, it is also marked by a deep
sensitivity to what is entailed, at the level of mythological and
organisational practice, in epochal change.
Let us begin at the point where I ask whether the assumption of
homogeneity inscribed in the notion of a single civic is not a
problem for democracy. The response comes in the form of two
answers:
Tee. it la • proble*. But I Bust lBaadiately qualify this etateaant. Tha authorltlaa and
other conasrvatlvee hava always had probleas with thla. But for ua It haa been • foolproof
way of coalng to a poaltlon on whera tha paopla i n . You suet underetand that our
atructura haa baan an obvious choice, we w«r* denied acceee to eny ~norael~ channele of
conaunlcatlon. Tha newspapers, atate televleion. every capital'drlvan source of
Information waa pitted against ua. 30 In turn w* had to pit ouraolvee against capital-
driven couunlcatlon. street coeaUttaee. area coaaiitteea. »aae Metlnga. were not elaply
our only alternative. They were an attack agalnat thoaa coaamnlcatlon lorae which decided
to be our enealea. They ware an alternative In a political eenee (respondent «).
And the second part of the response:
However, having aeld that, we ere now aovlng froej a sltuetion of a liberation eoveBent.
which loma facto tends to bring people together - eo there can only bo one poaltlon. But
once we eove Into the arena of party polltlca. the oueetlon ariaea whether you are going
to have one civic organisation for one erea. or «any civics aligning theaaelvee to various
political partlae. But In tn. .hnrf t.rm th.r. i-....r h. . m l rtl ff.r.n.-.. In th. .r.a
wt rtcaiUtnictlon Mil gCYllOratnt. This 1. pr.cls.lv why for th. ....nt th.r. ....t be
i clvlr with the ..ii. rntmr oxe.. (raepondsnt 4. eajphaala added)
But why can there be no great differences in the area of
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reconstruction and development, and more pertinently, why is an
organisational form of the past fitted to play a role in the
present?
Tots C&BIV confrontino utv ROW IS CO (urn r*>*»lottnts Ao to p&rticipAit tM or the now GCSIBOCrACic
order. But jou Bust underetand that there la no ready-made culture waiting to turn our
people Into pertlclpanta. on the contrary, aaln-etreaa culture la atlll pitted agalnet
UB. Finding a hoae In tha nan order will require great atrugglea. And we have nothing
to fight theee etrugglea barring tha fabric we palnetaklngly built up over the yeare. Thla
la why 1 aay that the yeaat of educating the people to be pertlclpanta and not proteatera
will be tha civic aoveBent. And thla la why I aay that the atructure of the civic and Ita
••ana of coaaunlcation and organleatlon. while not to be ralaed to the level of principle,
are tha appropriate aaana available to ua at thla tine In hlatory (reapondent 4).
And in conclusion:
•laeka are atlll united by a coaaton ezclualon. Only whan thla aicluelon haa been overcome
will tha baala for a alngla civic be In queetion. I'd aay that tha day our people
participate through aora eophietlcatad channela of eoaaunlcatlon. tha day we begin to cake
eubecrlptlone froa raaldante. that la the day the civic aay dovetail into varloua political
foraationa. 1 can't aay that thla aakea ae happy. It will bring aerloua problaaa. But
it la probably correct (reapondent 4).
I would personally disagree with much of what has been said. I
think that Julian Baskin's (1993) recent proposition that the
days of a single structure representing the developmental
interests of an entire community is an exhausted and unworkable
fiction, is deeply compelling. Yet, while such disagreements
might be important, something else is at stake here. Perhaps it
would be a little stilted to call it the unusualness and counter-
intuitiveness of a dual recognition. But let us explore this
notion anyhow.
On the hand, and in stark contrast to the other three interviews,
there is a deep recognition of the historicity of the political
culture forged under ASRO's leadership in the 1980s. What is
extirpated is the fantasy that ASRO's leadership has forged so
organic a unity, that it can spiral into a timeless, ever-present
window on a single, pristine, political will. In other words,
the discourse of this interview skirts being seduced by the
seeming timelessness of political myths, and instead registers
their provisional and temporary status.
And as soon as this character of political mythology is
registered, the space is open to conceive of civil society, not
as the privileged place of a transhistorical will, but as a site
whose ralson d'etre is a constant contest over political
identities and allegiances. In other words, what is registered
in this interview, is the reality that embodied in epochal change
is ultimately a process which effaces the political practice of
the old; in this instance, an effacement of the unicity of a
liberation struggle, and its replacement with the political
competition of democratization.
Yet the second pole of recognition registers the difficult
complexity of this transition. Democracy does not arrive tailor-
made, as if it somehow always existed outside of society, and was
just waiting to come down to refurnish the political landscape.
Rather, the new is built out of the material of the old,
precisely because this is the only place from which the new can
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possibly be produced. Like the liberation movement itself,
democratic practice will emerge at the interface of existing
relations of power.
In this sense, the interview places a paradoxical task on the
civic's shoulders. Its function is to usher in the conditions
of its own dissolution. It's goal is to forge from its practice
an entirely new practice, and thus to create its own
obsolescence.
Notably, little is spoken about the future. What will the
political landscape look like after the death of a single civic?
This question is never tackled with any seriousness. But perhaps
only those who are convinced of the efficacy of direct democracy
can genuinely attempt to answer this question and be convinced
that they have attained a degree of accuracy. For unless the
political wills of the future are already Inscribed in the past,
the contours of a future culture of pluralism can surely not be
mapped out in advance. To do so would be an attempt predict the
character of a symbolic environment which is yet to emerge. The
least that can be done in the present though, is to ensure that
what emerges with the new are the conditions of possibility for
the deepening of the political, for the transformation of the new
representative state into a deeply contested one.
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